Politics and Public Investment by Gupta, Sanjeev et al.
Catering to 
voters as 
elections 
approach 
can upend 
intelligent 
decisions on 
infrastructure 
spending
Politics and  
Public Investment
Sanjeev Gupta, Estelle Xue Liu, and Carlos Mulas-Granados
VIRTUALLY all countries need additional infrastructure such as roads, bridges, airports, telecom-munications networks, power 
plants, and public transportation. With inter-
est rates low—and, as a result, cheap financ-
ing for government spending—many ana-
lysts and policy advisors advocate increasing 
public investment in infrastructure to pro-
mote growth, which would both lower the 
debt-to-GDP ratio and expand an economy’s 
long-term productive capacity (IMF, 2014). 
However, even if shovel-ready projects 
have been identified and decision-making 
processes for public investment are working 
efficiently, investment still may not happen. 
Why?
Political considerations get in the way. When 
elections loom, policymakers choose to provide 
immediate benefits to the electorate through 
lower taxes or increased income transfers—at 
the expense of public investment, which takes 
time to come to fruition. Other factors can also 
play a role in discouraging needed investment. 
For example, the political orientation of parties 
that form a government may favor a lower level 
of public investment. 
When there are no political or institutional 
constraints, public investment should be deter-
mined mainly by development needs—to 
meet the requirements of a growing popula-
tion and to reduce infrastructure bottlenecks. 
Occasionally, public investment can be trig-
gered by demand management consider-
ations—for example, when an economy has 
spare capacity and policymakers believe invest-
ment would increase aggregate demand and 
raise employment in the short term. In reality, 
however, political considerations often strongly 
influence public investment decisions. 
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Bad incentives
William Nordhaus (1975) provided early modeling of how 
political cycles could affect economic decision making. He 
argued that incumbents have incentives to stimulate the 
economy before elections to achieve a temporary reduction in 
unemployment, an outcome preferred by voters, who in general 
have a short-term view. Research on the political economy of 
budget and fiscal policy has burgeoned. Four factors have been 
cited as possible ways political factors affect public investment:
• Politicians are opportunistic and, as a result, launch 
investment projects only at the beginning of the electoral 
term to be able to inaugurate them before the next election. 
As elections near, politicians choose to woo voters with pub-
lic sector wage increases, tax cuts, and cash transfers, finding 
the wherewithal to do that by cutting back on investment. 
• Fiscal outcomes reflect the ideology of different polit-
ical parties. For instance, a preference of right-wing parties 
for limited provision of state-owned physical and human 
capital would imply lower public investment in infrastruc-
ture, health, and education. On the other hand, left-wing 
parties prefer a more activist state, implying higher public 
investment in these areas. 
• Minority governments, a divided legislature, coali-
tions, and multiparty cabinets could result in fiscal prof-
ligacy and lower public investment. Large coalition and 
minority governments may have greater difficulty reaching 
agreement on balancing the budget. Government investment 
becomes easier to cut than some other types of spending. 
• Inadequate budgetary institutions—the rules and 
regulations by which budgets are drafted, approved, and 
implemented—are unable to protect public investment 
during a crisis. 
One or more of these four factors are likely to influence 
the behavior of public investment. We examined all of them 
to determine which factors dominate and under what circum-
stances (Gupta, Liu, and Mulas-Granados, 2015). We com-
piled a unique database from 
80 democracies during 1975 
to 2012, covering all regions 
and income levels. This data-
base includes national execu-
tive and legislative elections 
and differs in important ways 
from those in previous stud-
ies: it goes beyond advanced 
democracies and includes a 
wide range of emerging market 
and low-income countries with 
free and competitive elections 
and uses more precise electoral 
cycle measures by identifying 
the exact day, month, and year 
in which citizens went to the 
polls. For example, if an elec-
tion was held in November 
2012, we measure months to 
the next elections from this 
date. Data on election dates by month and year are from the 
Database of Political Institutions published by the World Bank. 
Our data show that public investment has declined over 
the past three decades across most economies (see Chart 1, 
left panel). In advanced economies, the ratio of public invest-
ment to GDP fell from about 5 percent in the mid-1980s to 
about 3 percent in 2014. In emerging market and low-income 
countries, the reduction was broadly similar, falling from 
close to 10 percent of GDP to about 7 to 8 percent of GDP 
during the same period. At the same time, public consump-
tion increased moderately—especially in advanced econo-
mies, where it reached almost 20 percent of GDP, in part 
reflecting rising health care and pension costs and other 
transfers associated with an aging population (see Chart 1, 
right panel). These long-term driving factors are compatible 
with the evidence that in the short run, investment cycles are 
also affected by political considerations. 
Election effects
Our analysis, which accounted for the effects of other rel-
evant variables on investment, found that as elections 
approach there is a deceleration of public investment as a 
share of GDP, coupled with a slight acceleration in current 
expenditures (see Chart 2). For example, public investment 
grows at 2 percent of GDP in the two to three years prior to 
elections, but when elections are about 12 months away, its 
growth not only slows, it becomes negative. The opposite is 
observed with regard to public consumption. This pattern 
is consistent with work by various scholars (such as Rogoff, 
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Chart 1
Falloff
Over the past three decades public investment as a percent of GDP has declined. Public consumption 
has varied.
(percent of GDP, ve-year average)                                                (percent of GDP, ve-year average)
Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF (2014); and World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2014.
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Chart 2
Electioneering
The average level of public investment spending is highest in the 
two to three years before elections . . .
(public investment, percent of GDP, year over year)           
Sources: IMF (2014); and IMF staff calculations. 
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before voters go to the polls.
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Chart 3
Spending peaks
Governments tend to do more investment spending early in their terms, but this phenomenon 
is more pronounced in emerging market economies.
(annual change in public investment, percent of GDP)               (annual change in public investment, percent of GDP)   
Source: Gupta, Liu, and Mulas-Granados (2015).
Note: The chart is a simulation that reects general behavior. Therefore there are no specic values on the y-axis. Any specic values would 
depend on underlying assumptions.
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1990) who have argued that electoral incentives may induce 
incumbents to shift public spending toward more “visible” 
government consumption and away from public investment. 
Our quantitative analysis confirms that growth in public 
investment starts to decelerate about two years before elections. 
In fact, for each year closer to the next election the growth rate 
of public investment in relation to GDP declines by 0.3 to 0.6 
percentage point. Between four and two years before elections, 
public investment accelerates. It seems that a typical govern-
ment makes most public investment at the beginning of its 
term and gradually shifts spending toward other items as the 
next election approaches (see Chart 3, left panel). 
These results hold whether a country is engaged in fis-
cal consolidation or fiscal expansion. But when considering 
different country groups, interesting nuances emerge with 
respect to how the strength of fiscal institutions may help 
soften the effects of elections on public investment cycles. For 
example, in advanced economies, which are older democra-
cies and possess relatively stronger institutions to ensure 
efficient public investment planning, allocation, and execu-
tion, public investment growth peaks much later during the 
electoral cycle (see Chart 3, right panel), and the decelera-
tion of public investment is smaller. This could be explained 
by three interrelated considerations: because public invest-
ment processes are more robust in advanced economies, the 
potential for manipulating them is limited compared with 
other country groups; in mature democracies policy-making 
processes are more transparent, and the electorate tends to 
punish incumbents for manipulating spending; and incum-
bent governments do not need to signal their competence by 
varying public investment spending because they have other 
means to do so, such as effective communication on fiscal 
policy, efficient tax policies, and project execution. 
Sustained booms
We have focused so far on short-term investment decisions. 
Are the same political factors behind multiyear episodes of 
sustained investment booms over a longer time horizon? 
Typically, multiyear investment spending is the result of 
long-term strategies to expand the productive capacity of 
economies: governments invest in public capital for several 
years—a highway project that takes several years to complete, 
for example. One would expect multiyear investment booms 
to be less affected by electoral  considerations, because they 
last longer than the usual four to five years a government 
is in office. For example, between 
1980 and 2012, the United States 
had three episodes of sustained 
increase in public investment (see 
Chart 4), with a combined duration 
of 18 years. The first period started 
at the end of Democrat Jimmy 
Carter’s administration in the late 
1970s and continued for almost 
eight years through the presidency 
of Republican Ronald Reagan. The 
second coincided with the second 
term of Democrat Bill Clinton. 
The third episode began after the 
reelection of Republican President 
George W. Bush in 2004 and con-
tinued until 2009, a year into the 
first term of President Barack 
Obama, a Democrat. 
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To explore these long-term dynamics, we identify the 
change in public investment from the lowest level of the 
investment episode to the highest level of the episode. 
Between 1975 and 2012, we count 264 episodes of investment 
booms in the 80 democracies in our database. The average 
size of an investment boom is 3.8 percent of GDP, with the 
biggest increase being 26 percent of GDP in Lesotho between 
1978 and 1982, and the smallest an increase of 0.3 percent of 
GDP in the United States between 1998 and 2003. 
Our quantitative analysis confirms that in the long run, 
political characteristics such as cabinet fragmentation and 
ideology are more important than elections in explaining 
the size of sustained investment booms. More right-wing 
governments are associated with smaller increases in public 
investment, unless they are faced with a divided legislature 
and pro-investment parliamentary coalitions, as was some-
times the case in the United States during the Reagan and 
George W. Bush administrations. Fragmented governments 
are also associated with smaller sustained investment booms. 
Policy implications
Three important policy implications can be drawn from 
our research. First, even when macroeconomic conditions 
in terms of fiscal space and monetary policy are appropri-
ate and effective shovel-ready investment projects are avail-
able, it may not be possible to expand public investment 
when an election approaches. The incentive for incum-
bent governments is to increase “visible” current spending 
on tax cuts, public wages, or public transfer programs to 
shore up political support. Such spending may be difficult 
to reverse, which creates a bias toward ongoing deficits. 
It may also affect the long-term growth potential of the 
economy, because election pressures may generate subop-
timal levels of public investment, thus reducing investment 
in such things as roads and airports and other areas that 
would enhance an economy’s ability to deliver goods and 
services. Second, when countries approach international 
organizations for advice or financial support, financial 
assistance programs should explicitly recognize the bias 
in favor of current spending that occurs about two years 
prior to elections. Stronger fiscal policy design during this 
period could help restrain permanent ratcheting up of cer-
tain spending items. Finally, the best option to insulate 
the public investment cycle from electoral pressures is to 
strengthen budget institutions and improve public invest-
ment management systems. ■
Sanjeev Gupta is Deputy Director and Estelle Xue Liu and 
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Chart 4
U.S. spending booms
Since 1980 there have been three sustained multiyear 
increases in public investment spending in the United States.
(public investment spending, percent of GDP)           
Source: Gupta, Liu, and Mulas-Granados (2015).
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